Abstract-In this paper, we prove unconditional security for a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on distilling pbits (twisted ebits) from an arbitrary untrusted state that is claimed to contain distillable key. Our main result is that we can verify security using only public communication-via parameter estimation of the given untrusted state. The technique applies even to bound-entangled states, thus extending QKD to the regime where the available quantum channel has zero quantum capacity. We also show how to convert our purification-based QKD schemes to prepare/measure schemes.
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I. BACKGROUND, PROBLEM, AND RESULT
A large class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols is based on entanglement-purification protocols (EPP). We use the shorthand EPP-QKD for these protocols. It is known that a secure key can be obtained by locally measuring two systems prepared in some maximally entangled state (also known as EPR pairs [1] or ebits). The security and working principle of EPP-QKD are based on the ability of two separated parties to estimate error rates of an untrusted shared state relative to ebits and subsequently to distill ebits. In [2] , it was found that the most general quantum state (known to the users) that provides a secure key (after measurement) is not an ebit. It is called a pbit or "twisted ebit." These pbits can likewise be distilled or purified from known shared states. This paper is focused on the scenario when the users share untrusted states, and on how to devise QKD schemes under such circumstances based on pbit-purification protocols (PPP). We call these protocols PPP-QKD. The main goal is to devise an analogous error estimation scheme relative to pbits, using only public classical communication. The scheme applies to some "bound-entangled" initial states that are nonetheless sufficiently close to pbits. (A state is bound entangled if no ebits can be distilled from many copies of it.) Consequently, there are channels that cannot be used to send quantum information (zero quantum capacity), but that can be used for QKD (nonzero key capacity). Furthermore, in spirit similar to [3] , we provide a recipe for converting PPP-QKD to their associated prepare/measure schemes (P/M-QKD). We will concentrate on the verification scheme of Lo, Chau, and Ardehali [4] , [5] where bit and phase error rates are estimated. We instead estimate "twisted" bit and phase error rates. Our proof uses classical random sampling theory and the exponential quantum de Finetti theorem [6] .
First, in Section I-A, we provide a pedagogical review on the essential concepts of QKD. Readers familiar with QKD can skip the review. Then, in Section I-B, we discuss the current problem followed by a precise statement of our results in Section I-D as well as related results in Section I-E. The proof of security is contained in Section II with the essence of it being in Section II-D. In Section III, we follow this up by a discussion on how to convert our protocol to a P/M-QKD scheme and give an example of QKD using a binding-entanglement channel in Section IV where the error rate is so high that quantum capacity vanishes. An interesting observation that the users will not need to know about what private state they share and how to exploit this fact is given in Section VI. We have built our protocols piece by piece, and a summary of the complete protocols is given in Section V. We conclude in Section VII with other remarks and a discussion of open problems. Proofs are detailed in the Appendix, and the theorems are restated in the body of this paper.
A. Review of QKD
In the quantum world, it is generally impossible to extract information about a quantum state without disturbing it [7] . This principle enables unconditionally secure key distribution that is impossible classically. Key distribution is the task of establishing a key between two parties, Alice and Bob. Informally, a key distribution protocol is secure if the probability to establish a compromised key vanishes. (In the above statement, we have allowed the key length to vary and when it is zero, the protocol "aborts." See, also, [8] .) If a protocol (given some stated resources) is secure against the most powerful adversary (Eve) limited only by laws of physics, its security is "unconditional."
0018-9448/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE In QKD, Alice and Bob can use a quantum channel (from Alice to Bob) and classical channels (in both directions). These can be noisy and controlled by Eve. In addition, Alice and Bob have local coins and, in some cases, quantum computers. These can be noisy but they are not controlled by Eve. Finally, Alice and Bob share a small initial key. Using the quantum universal composability result [9] , most of the imperfect resources can be made near-perfect while preserving security-the classical channels and local resources can be made reliable and authenticated using the initial key and coding. We make these simplifying assumptions from now on, and focus on imperfections in the quantum channel. (As a side remark, for arbitrary adversarial imperfections in the quantum channel, no coding method can convert it to a perfect quantum channel. Fortunately, QKD requires less (see above) and this paper revolves around the minimal requirement on the quantum channel.)
First, we give the intuition behind the security offered by quantum mechanics assuming a noiseless quantum channel. Alice and Bob preagree on a set of nonorthogonal quantum states; each may be transmitted by Alice through the quantum channel with some probabilities. (This is the case in the earliest QKD scheme called BB84 [10] .) Eve can intercept and compromise the quantum signals but they will be disturbed. Bob tells Alice when he receives the states, and they subsequently detect disturbance using some of the states, and if they observe none, they extract a key from the rest of the states; otherwise, they abort the protocol.
QKD based on noisy channels is important for two reasons. First, natural noise is inevitable and can be used as a disguise by an eavesdropper. Second, it is desirable to be able to generate a key despite some malicious attack. Initial work [11] , [12] was done based on error estimation, privacy amplification [13] , and error correction. Mayers first gave an unconditional security proof for QKD [14] , showing that BB84 can provide a key up to 8% observed error.
Later on, Lo and Chau [4] reported a security proof for a different QKD scheme based on E91 [15] : Alice and Bob first share some noisy, untrusted state . (We tag the state with a "question mark" to emphasize that the users cannot ascertain its identity.) It is supposed to be copies of , where is a computational basis for the local systems and possessed by Alice and Bob, respectively.
is called a maximally entangled state (MES). When , it is also called an EPR pair or "ebit." arises from Alice preparing local copies of and transmitting Bob's shares through an untrusted channel of dimensions. Eve can attack on all systems jointly. For now, we focus on the case (just like [4] ). After Bob receives the state, Alice and Bob extract a smaller number of nearly perfect ebits, from which a key is obtained by measuring in the local computational basis. It is possible for , when QKD is aborted. The Lo-Chau proof is simple-however the noise arises, Alice and Bob just detect and remove it, and doing so only involves standard techniques in EPP or distillation [16] .
The disadvantage of the Lo-Chau proof is that its associated scheme requires quantum storage and coherent manipulation of quantum data, neither of which is required in BB84. Shor and Preskill [3] provided a recipe to relate BB84 to the E91/Lo-Chau scheme, such that the security of the former is implied by that of the latter. Furthermore, results in [3] can be generalized to many other variants of BB84 (collectively called P/M-QKD scheme) so that their security can be proved via that of a related purification-based QKD scheme.
B. Step-by-Step QKD and Motivation of Current Problem
We discuss useful general concepts by interpreting the Lo-Chau scheme [4] as follows. Alice and Bob preagree on a set of parameters for states, and let sets of states sharing the same parameters be labeled as . (It will be clear later how they should be chosen.) The protocol is a four-step process for Alice and Bob.
1) Distribute an untrusted bipartite state using the untrusted resources. 2) Perform tests (via public discussion) on such that if , the test will output with high probability. They only need to know which (or ) but not which , and the remaining procedure depends only on and applies to all states in . For example, in the Lo-Chau scheme, consists of two error rates (bit and phase) and is the set of states arising from inflicting errors of rates to the Bell states [see Definition 1 and (3) in Section II-A for a precise definition].
3) Based on the parameter , apply an appropriate EPP to and output a state . This procedure, if applied to any state in , will return a state , which is a good approximation of a known and trusted state (e.g., ebits in E91/Lo-Chau). 4) Generate a key by measuring locally. The key can have varying sizes (depending on ), and zero key-length means "abort QKD."
We will refer to these four steps (and their variations) repeatedly throughout this paper.
To generalize the Lo-Chau scheme, we examine the requirements for each of these steps (in reverse order).
We start with step 4): Simply suppose Alice and Bob share a known and trusted state . What (other than ) will generate a secure key? In [1] , a characterization of all such was given to be (up to local unitaries on and )
where is the MES of local dimension , the subscripts and denote systems held by Alice and Bob, are unitary so that is also unitary, and is any state (pure or mixed) of some arbitrary dimension . (Note that and the key generated has size .) in (2) is called the twisting operator, and any given by (1) is called a pdit (or private state, twisted state, and gamma state). In some sense, (1) and (2) characterize all the noise on an MES that is harmless for the purpose of generating a key. We state this property for the twisting operator more precisely.
Observation 1 (See [1] and [17] ? We call such states "key distillable" (even though they are not of tensor power form). The conversion procedure has to work for all states in . A complete characterization is unlikely to be tractable and we only have examples. The canonical example in [4] is the set of states with sufficiently low error rates relative to perfect ebits. We will call these " -good-ebits." These are not necessarily tensor power or product states [see Definition 1 and (3)]. Here, EPP works for all -good-ebits independent of which one is the initial state. Another example are tensor power states . In this case, one says that a protocol achieves a "key rate" if it converts to for some given by (2), allowing to be asymptotically large. For example, protocols and lower bounds for are found in [18] for general .
We mention some surprising facts about private states and key-distillable states. All perfect pdits ( ) contain some distillable entanglement. However, there are families of pdits with vanishing amount of distillable entanglement, but they can be used to provide a key with constant rate. Also, there are states close to pdits and they have distillable key (lower bound from [18] ) but have no distillable entanglement (upper bound from showing the positivity of the partial tranpose (PPT) [19] , [20] ).
Switching from trusted states to untrusted states, we now move on to the main concern of this paper. In step 2), what sets contain key-distillable states and admit parameter estimation? What are the corresponding tests for finding if ? In the Lo-Chau proof, are ebits and can be chosen to be -good-ebits [these are states with bounded error relative to ebits; see Definition 1 and (3)]. In the most general case, is a pdit and a natural question is, can all key-distillable be tested?
We believe that the above question is difficult, by considering all possible " -good-pbits": states obtained from applying any twisting operation to -good-ebits, where the twisting can act jointly on the entire system. Without further restriction on the joint twisting operation, it is unclear how to perform parameter estimation on the joint state.
One particularly useful class of -good-pbits are those obtained from applying tensor power twisting on -good-ebits. We will call these states -twisted--good-pbits (note that just like -good-ebits, -twisted--good-pbits need not be tensor power states). (See also Definion 2.) Prior to this work, it was shown in [21] how to perform parameter estimation for containing -twisted--good-pbits that have some distillable entanglement. There, the important distinction from the Lo-Chau scheme is that, in [21] , entanglement is only distilled for parameter estimation but not for the subsequent key generation. In particular, the entanglement distilled in the scheme of [21] can be in negligible quantity compared to the key size. However, [21] leaves many questions unanswered, in particular, whether can contain bound-entangled but key-distillable states, and whether distilling entanglement (albeit a little) is necessary. Also, the test in [21] prevents easy conversion to a simpler class of schemes called P/M-QKD (see below).
In this paper, we will show by an explicit protocol that parameter estimation is possible for all containing states that can be converted into -twisted--good-pbits by LOCC operations (involving only local operations and public classical communications). Furthermore, this new estimation procedure does not involve distillation so that it applies to bound-entangled states; it only involves product observables (see Definition 3), allowing easy conversion to P/M-QKD, as we will see later.
C. Our Adversarial Setting
Throughout this paper, we are concerned with unconditional security of QKD, in which nothing is assumed about the actual channel used or about the actual state shared . There are three separate notions that we want to mention explicitly.
• Alice and Bob use an underlying quantum resource "A" (a channel or quantum state) in order to execute QKD. They have some knowledge about this resource, for example, the natural channel loss due to their distance can be theoretically calculated.
• During any specific execution, this resource is subject to further unknown attack to produce the actual channel or state "B." This will remain unknown to Alice and Bob throughout.
• What is known to Alice and Bob in an execution is a set of observed error rates "C." The insecurity of QKD can be quantified by the probability that the state has been compromised more than the observed error rates have suggested. Security is a consequence of the test procedure to obtain "C," and is independent of any of the above.
It is a combination of the QKD protocol and the observed error "C" that determines the actual key rate, and this depends on the actual channel or state "B," which in turns cannot be better than the underlying resource "A." This is why analysis of a QKD protocol often refers to the underlying resource "A": the protocol, starting with resource "A" and subject to further unknown attack, will result in some potentially worse observed error rates that may still give the green light to establish a secure key. can be used to describe both concepts "A" and "C."
To repeat, given resource "A" that is too noisy, QKD gives zero key rate whether there is eavesdropping or not. On the other hand, no matter how good "A" is, too much eavesdropping should also give a zero key rate; so, QKD is only interesting given good enough underlying quantum resource "A" together with a scheme to ensure security. The goal of this paper can be understood as characterizing what underlying resources "A" are good enough under our scheme.
D. Statement of the Results
In this paper, we report a new test procedure in step 2) for any containing -twisted--good-pbits. Since Alice and Bob can use LOCC in QKD, our procedure also applies to any containing states that can be converted into -twisted--good-pbits by LOCC. In particular, these include the following: 1) -twisted--good-pbits themselves, and 2) tensor power key-distillable states. This new method does not require distilling entanglement and it applies independently of whether has distillable entanglement or is bound entangled.
The protocol in this paper is similar to that in [21] , and it is also a "twist" from the original Lo-Chau scheme. In the critical step of phase error estimation, we test for "twisted phase errors" (phase errors in the basis defined by the twisting operation) just as in [21] . In [21] , the test is based on entanglement distillation and teleportation. Here, our new procedure uses a more recently found finite quantum de Finetti theorem with exponential convergence [6] and it requires only local resources, measurement of product observables (Definition 3), and classical communication. This has significant consequences.
1) There are quantum channels that have zero quantum capacity but nonzero key capacity. Each set of states captures what Alice and Bob expect to be. It summarizes deviations from perfect pbits including channel noise and noise inflicted by eavesdropping. For example, Alice and Bob can have prior knowledge of the presumably available quantum channel (resource "A" in Section I-C), which is susceptible to further attack by an eavesdropper. Our work extends QKD to the regime when this presumably available quantum channel cannot transmit quantum data and only allows sharing of a bound-entangled key-distillable state at best (without an eavesdropper). With the unknown eavesdropping attack, the final key rate depends on the combined noise level, and it can potentially be positive. (In the static case, there are states that are untrusted and presumably bound entangled that can still give a secure key.) 2) There is a recipe to obtain prepare/measure schemes based on private states. Remarkably, in the noiseless case, E91 is mathematically related to many P/M-QKD schemes including BB84. P/M-QKD only requires quantum states to be prepared and sent by Alice, and measured by Bob without being stored, thus, minimal coherent quantum manipulations. P/M-QKD has much practical advantage over distillation-or purification-based schemes, but the latter often has simple unconditional security proofs. Shor and Preskill [3] illustrated mathematical connections between two types of schemes even in the noisy case for some EPP. Starting from the Lo-Chau security proof, they rederived one for BB84 similar to Mayer's. Gottesman and Lo [22] generalized the connection to more general EPP. Likewise, our new test procedure allows the purification-based scheme to be transformed to a P/M-QKD. This can be useful in implementation. We note a side result that may be of independent interest-that average values of an observable in a bulk system can be estimated in a sublinear sample even when the observable cannot be directly measured. This will be discussed more in Section VII.
E. Related Work
As already noted, this paper is a followup of [21] on parameter estimation of untrusted states relative to pbits. The scheme in [21] requires a small amount of distillable entanglement-it does not apply to bound-entangled states and thus cannot be used on states generated by a channel with zero quantum capacity.
An earlier version of the current result (unpublished) used an exact but polynomial quantum de Finetti theorem [23] , from which we obtained a much lower key rate. The new exponential quantum de Finetti theorem (exp-QDFT) in [6] provides much better bounds and properties.
There are two intuitive solutions to the current problem of parameter estimation. The first is a state-tomographic estimation, which was suggested in [1] , but the accuracy and the security were not analyzed. It is interesting to note here that exp-QDFT provides exactly the tool for doing so. Whatever is, Alice and Bob can simply choose half of the systems (or any linear amount) at random, and the chosen state is exponentially close to a mixture of "almost-power-state."
can be chosen to be tensor powers of key-distillable states and the test for simply involves state tomography using only measurement of product observables and classical communication. (During the final preparation of the manuscript, we heard of some work in progress using this approach [24] .) This paper follows another intuitive approach-error estimation in the twisted basis, via a decomposition of the twisted observable into product observables (see Definition 3). Intriguingly, a natural choice of the set of product observables is also tomographically complete. However, discarding is not necessary here. The main challenge is a rigorous security proof, along with a careful analysis of how various parameters are related. We have used many different elements (including the exp-QDFT) in [6] , along with earlier techniques such as quantum-classical-reduction and various random sampling techniques [4] , [5] , and also ideas from [21] .
In this paper, we have also emphasized various useful concepts, such as "harmless errors" and the structural constituents of QKD. Examples of harmless errors (most generally defined by the private states) were observed in earlier works by Aschauer and Briegel [25] and were used in [26] - [28] to improve the key rate. Various useful structural descriptions of QKD, revolving more around P/M-QKD, have also been proposed before [5] , [29] , [6] .
After the initial presentation of this result [30] , and during the preparation of this paper, Renes and Smith [31] reported the following related result. The P/M-QKD scheme [26] , [32] that uses local noise inflicted by Alice to increase the key rate has an interpretation as a QKD scheme based on distributing and distilling a particular private/twisted state. Thus, they arrived at an (existing) example of P/M-QKD based on private states [but the state has to be (ebit) distillable since the noise is local]. This is complementary to our current result [item (2) ] that aims at a general recipe to convert distillation-based schemes to P/M-QKD.
Finally, a summary of this paper without the technical details was included in [33] .
II. DETAILS OF OUR RESULT
Recall that in the current formulation of QKD, the goal is to accurately test whether the shared bipartite state is in some set , and if so, apply a transformation that will bring any state in that to a state close to a private state . The test and transformation use only LOCC. Note that is determined by eavesdropping and channel properties, while and the test is part of the design of the QKD scheme. We will describe and prove the security of a QKD scheme with containing -twisted--good-pbits (see Definition 2). As described before, our procedure also applies to any containing states that can be converted into -twisted--good-pbits by LOCC, by prepending such transformation to our scheme. As an example, may contain tensor power of key-distillable states for arbitrarily large . Since is key distillable, such that can be preprocessed by (via LOCC) to a state that approximates some private state to some predetermined accuracy (the dimension of the key part is then for some ). To test if (i.e., whether ), Alice and Bob can first apply the preprocessing to , followed by our estimation procedure for containing , which is a -twisted--good-pbit. Clearly, if , the above test will pass with high probability. There are several subtle points concerning this reduction: 1) the key-rate can be suboptimal; 2) the preprocessing may prevent the QKD scheme from being easily converted to P/M-QKD schemes; 3) the dimension of the new key part is finite but can be large for finite preprocessing precision, and the accuracy of our test has a strong dimensional dependence.
We will also return to one other observation in Section VI that for a given state, it can be related to many different pbits (defined by different twisting operations). Consequently, the error rate of a state relative to each pbit, and thus the key rate, depends on the choice of the pbit being considered and should be optimized. For now, we consider an arbitrary choice, such as one arising from the knowledge of the available channel. In Section VI, we will describe a simple method for the optimization.
Both [21] and this paper exploit the relation between -goodebits and -good-pbits. They differ only by a change of basis [in particular, for -twisted--good-pbits, the change is simply given by the tensor power of the single-system twisting operation (2)]. The fact that the twisting is not an LOCC operation, of course, changes all the nonlocal resource accounting, but surprisingly, as we will see, a variation of the Lo-Chau scheme is invariant under twisting, except for one step.We detail how and why the Lo-Chau scheme works and explain how that exceptional step can be circumvent.
A. Concepts in Tolerable Attacks
Core to the analysis of QKD using noisy resources is a notion of tolerable adversarial attacks, which are quantified by the parameters to be estimated. (For example, these are chosen to be the number of bit-flip and phase-flip errors in the transmitted qubits in many schemes.) We make this notion precise in the following, and develop notations used throughout this paper. Consider an -qubit system. Let be the Pauli group acting on it (parameter omitted). For each , up to a scalar factor in , , where are the generators for the qubit Pauli group, and are matrix exponents. It will become clear that the scalar factor is irrelevant in our work, thus each is represented by the two -bit strings and , which we will call the " -and -components" of . The number of 1's in a bitstring is called its Hamming weight. Let . They will represent two error rates critical in the security of QKD. Collect all 's in that have -and -components with Hamming weights no greater than and into a set , and denote the linear span of (over ) by . The eavesdropping attack of current interest, described as a trace-preserving completely positive (TCP) map, is of the form (3) where for all and where the usual trace-preserving condition holds. Note that , and when equality holds, is the set of all bounded operators, thus, any eavesdropping attack is of the form (3) for sufficiently large . For the case of qubit transmission, we omit the in the notation for the maximally entangled state and . Using (3), we have the important definition.
Definition 1 ( -Good-Ebit):
We call the state " -good-ebits," where acts on the qubits of Bob and the identity map acts on the qubits of Alice.
Note that -good-ebits are not necessarily tensor power states. We now define the analogue in a twisted basis.
Definition 2 ( -Twisted--Good-Pbit):
We call the state " -twisted--good-pbits," where is a twisting operator given by (2) , and the ancillary state can be arbitrary over all the ancillary systems .
B. Lo-Chau Scheme
The Lo-Chau scheme focuses on the case. Alice uses the channel times to send Bob's halves of ebits she prepared locally. In the absence of Eve, shared after step 1) should differ from by the channel noise. It thus makes sense to use as the parameter in , and define to be the set of all -good-ebits. Here, are called the bit and phase error rates, respectively. When eavesdropping is possible, Alice and Bob need to determine for which with high probability. In security proofs, we do not lose security if we assume less. So, we let to be completely unconstrained and allow Eve to possess the purification of . (A purification of a mixed state on a system is a pure state on two systems such that tracing out the extra system will give . The purifying system contains all information related to outside of it.) Since is a basis for , the purification of , , has the form
Here, ranges over all possible -qubit Pauli operators in and acts on Bob's qubits, are arbitrary amplitudes, and are normalized states on system .
Step 2) in the Lo-Chau scheme is carried out by estimating the error rates and by random sampling of the systems without replacement. To estimate , systems are chosen randomly and is measured on each of them, and the estimated is the number of outcomes divided by . (Note that the outcome of measuring on an ebit should be when there is zero (one) error). In other words, one measures , the eigenvalue of , where denotes the th sampled system, and estimate to be (similarly, for ). Next, we will describe the estimation process in two ways, a simple abstraction and the actual implementation, and we show that they are equivalent.
In the abstract, the error estimation transforms the state to (5) where the experimental estimate of the error rates of the QKD execution is in the system available to all three parties. In a good estimation procedure, the estimated error rates should not deviate significantly from the actual values, except with very small probability. Let be the Hamming weights of the -and -components of . A good estimation translates to the mathematical statement that, for each , the sum of over should be small whenever or is significant. In [5] , a test procedure for the Lo-Chau scheme is provided, based on random sampling that achieves the following. For small and for , we have (6) where with natural rather than base , so that if . In (6), the probability is over the random sample taken for the error estimate. 1 To achieve good estimation is a central aspect of QKD. The proof in [5] is subtle: measurement of commutes with measurement of so that whether the former is done cannot change the distribution of the latter. So, we can assume measurement of has been done here. Most importantly, such assumption applies even to actual indirect measurements of that may not commute with measurement of , as long as the indirect measurement gives accurate results, and all intermediate results (except for the final outcome) are discarded (see argument to follow). This imagined measurement of turns both and into classical random variables so that classical random sampling theory can be applied.
In real experiments, there are two differences from the abstraction. First, the intended measurement operators 1 Using [5, p. 34] and realizing that A(; p) (p0) =(p(10p)ln 2) to lowest order in p0 (note that p is not necessary) and running the argument for both black and white balls, we get a two-sided bound. Let m be the sample size, n be the total number of systems, and ; , ; be as defined in the text. Then If m < n (usually m p n or log n), then Pr( j 0 j ) 2 1 exp 02m :
and are nonlocal (these are parity measurements in the conjugate and computational bases), but they are implemented via local measurements, for example, the eigenvalue of is obtained by measuring that of and on the properly paired systems and classically taking the product of the two outcomes ( ). Second, the random samples will be irreversibly measured out. We want to replace the analysis of the real experiments by that of the abstraction, and we now show that such replacement is valid if we impose certain conditions on the protocol, as detailed in Observation 2.
Observation 2: If Alice and Bob perform the following: 1) local (demolition) measurements, 2) classical communication of the outcomes, 3) classical postprocessing and output a function of the outcomes, 4) discard all measured systems, all intermediate outcomes, and communicated messages, then the procedure is equivalent to a direct measurement yielding the function (and nothing else) and discarding the measured system.
Proof: Local measurements can be made "coherently" so that the outcome is stored in the computational basis of an ancilla without being read. Classical communication from Alice to Bob can be modeled as the isometry , where Eve's copy ensures classicality and generality of the security argument. It is similar for classical communication from Bob to Alice. Then, Alice and Bob perform the classical postprocessing (locally) to derive the same intended measurement outcome. Besides this, they discard everything else, i.e., they give to Eve all measured systems, their copies of the coherent classical communication, and the workspace of the classical postprocessing, and Eve can reconstruct the postmeasurement state. The entire procedure is thus equivalent to the desired direct measurement.
We keep in mind not to use the samples again. We can analyze the state in (5) in the abstract setting. This state can be rewritten as (7) where the primed sum of is now restricted to those terms in which are close to , respectively, and the unnormalized contains all other terms with bad estimates. The important point is that has norm squared bounded by . (To see this, label the sum over those by a double prime, and .) We include this bad term in our equations to keep track of the entire picture, but we need not worry about its evolution.
In step 3), based on the estimates , Alice and Bob run any applicable EPP (e.g., see [16] and [22] ) on the unmeasured systems. In the abstract, the state becomes
To obtain the above expression, note that the output of EPP depends on , , and random inputs of EPP. Taking a coherent description for the local coins, and focusing on one -term in the primed sum where error estimate is accurate, EPP produces an output with high fidelity with respect to , where is the entanglement rate depending mostly on (and slightly on for finite effect, and finally, negligibly on the local coins because this effect can be removed by lowering the rate slightly). We collect the rest of the system into a sufficiently large auxiliary space. Uhlmann's theorem [34] guarantees an output state for the -term in the form inside the parenthesis: the auxiliary output states and the bad EPP term are orthonormal, with , , and upper bounded by a function exponentially decaying with [16] , [3] , [22] , [35] . If are too high, and implicitly QKD is aborted (yet preserving security). The incoherence between the different terms can be absorbed into the auxiliary system. In real experiments, EPP is done incoherently, but as long as Alice and Bob refrain from using anything other than the final output (i.e., discarding everything else) the abstract picture will hold.
Finally, Alice and Bob measure out a key from the systems, which has high fidelity to ebits (when conditioning on other systems is NOT made). This guarantees security [8] in the universal composable definition [9] , [8] . In particular, let the ideal state be , and the output in the last equation be . Then, the QKD (in)security parameter in [8] is upper bounded by (because ). Roughly speaking, it means that if an ideal key used in any application is replaced by the one generated in the QKD protocol, no attack involving all parts of the application can achieve a statistical difference better than the stated insecurity parameter.
Note that if better EPP protocols are found and used in QKD (more rapidly vanishing ), the above analysis implies corresponding improvement in the key rate and security of the resulting QKD. As a concrete example, in [22] , a scheme is presented that achieves a key rate of where is the binary entropy function and are the observed error rates, and is nonzero for if (and vice versa) or . It follows from Section I-C that underlying states or channels with less error has the potential to establish a secure key.
We end this section with a definition for a useful concept we came across.
Definition 3 (Product Versus Nonproduct Observables):
A product observable (with respect to systems and ) is one of the form . While nonlocal, it can be measured using LOCC: perform the individual local measurements and , exchange the classical outcomes, and calculate the product.
C. Replacing EPP by EC/PA
In [3] and [22] , classes of EPP were found to have a very nice property when used in EPP-QKD. If Alice and Bob apply EPP followed by final measurements in the computational basis to extract a key, their many steps can be rearranged without changing the security of the final key. In particular, the rearranged protocol has the computational basis measurement done first, generating what is called a "sifted-raw-key" (the adjective "sifted" is only useful later in the mapping to P/M-QKD). The steps of the original EPP become (classical) error correction (EC) on the sifted-raw-key followed by privacy amplification (PA) to generate the final key. Such EPP includes 1-EPP protocols corresponding to CSS codes (i.e., involving only parity checks entirely in the computational basis, or entirely in the conjugate basis), and also 2-EPP protocols that are CSS like, symmetric with respect to exchanging Alice and Bob, and with each step depending only on prior measurement outcomes in the computational basis. We will call such schemes EC/PALo-Chau schemes, which, from now on, are always being considered in place of the original Lo-Chau scheme.
In [3] , [22] , and [5] , recipes to convert EPP-QKD to the simpler P/M-QKD are provided. We will first describe a pbit-distillation-based QKD scheme (PPP-QKD) and in the next section provide a security proof. In Section III, we outline a conversion to P/M-QKD for our PPP-QKD scheme.
D. QKD Based on -Twisted--Good-Pbits
First, we consider the case in direct correspondence with the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme, again omitting the notations in and . After step 1), Alice and Bob are sharing untrusted state , and in step 2), Alice and Bob want to test if such that , where
is a set of -twisted--good-pbits (see Definition 2) for some satisfying (2) and some arbitrary ancillary state on . In principle, Alice and Bob only need to find , but not and as long as they exist. We will see that the protocol is independent of . For now, we assume they make a certain guess for and we will come back to remove this requirement in Section VI.
Consider the following unfeasible scheme: first untwist, i.e., apply to , then apply the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme. This is equivalent to running the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme in the case of , and thus, it is secure. The problem is that untwisting is global and requires resources unavailable in real-life QKD. Our strategy is to write down (mathematically) this secure but unfeasible scheme as a first step. Then, we explain security-preserving modifications that make the scheme feasible using the usual resources allowed in QKD. In short, this is possible because only one step in EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme is affected by the twisting and untwisting operations (see, also, [21] ). The exceptional step is the estimation of in the twisted basis. In [21] , it was handled by first distilling some ebits followed by teleportation of a small number of test systems to enable untwisting. Here, it will be handled without distilling ebits.
In detail, this secure but unfeasible protocol runs as follows. 2) Apply untwisting to , then estimate and on the systems (by using and random samples respectively), and finally reapply . 3 ) Apply untwisting and measure out a sifted-raw-key in the systems.
4 ) Perform error correction and privacy amplification on the sifted-raw-key via one-or two-way public discussion. Now, we explain how to transform the above protocol to one involving only measurements of product observables and classical communication, and in particular, without the distillation of ebits. In step 2), only a random subset of systems are measured. On the other untested systems, the untwisting and twisting cancel out (thus can be omitted). On the tested systems, for the estimate of , untwisting, measuring , and twisting (where is a label of the tested sample) are equivalent to the measurement of , where . Here, is a nonproduct observable (see Definition 3), and generally, it cannot be measured in a one-shot manner using LOCC. However, our goal is to estimate by measuring the combined , which is an average of over many different systems, and for this purpose, we can apply some other LOCC measurement. The method and the accuracy will be given in the next paragraph. For the estimate of , the twisted observable is simply , because commutes with and , so the original analysis of [4] holds, and samples are used for this estimate. In steps 3') and 4'), the computational basis measurement to obtain the sifted-raw-key and the rest of the classical postprocessing all commute with . Thus, we can finish the entire QKD protocol before the untwisting, which then clearly does nothing and can be omitted.
LOCC Estimation of Via Product Observables:
The goal is to replace a measurement of by an LOCC measurement of product observables, such that the outcomes have similar average values. We denote the probability distribution of the outcome of measuring by , and that of the LOCC measurement of product observables by , and their averages by and . If the state being measured is fixed, and are fixed, but and are random variables depending on the measurement outcomes.
We now explain the LOCC measurement that generates . First, obtain a decomposition for the single system observable into product observables (9)
where is a basis (trace-orthonormal) for Hermitian operators acting on and , and . Second, Alice and Bob divide their samples into groups. They use each group for one pair of , and they obtain a measurement outcome denoted by of the observable . This is related to a sum of product observables and can be measured in LOCC as mentioned before (Alice and Bob can individually measure and on the th test system, multiply their results via LOCC, and finally sum those products over ) and take average. Also, let be the "outcome" of the LOCC estimation of the phase error rate, defining a distribution . Is close to that is generated by measuring directly? It will be if the entire sample systems are in a joint tensor power state, and if is large enough [because Chernoff-like bounds will hold and because of (10)]. However, in our current problem, Alice and Bob share , which is not a tensor power state. Fortunately, first, by means of random sampling, we can assume permutation symmetry in this analysis, and second, since the estimation involves only a small portion of the entire systems, the exponential quantum de Finetti theorem [6] states that the measured (reduced) state is close to a mixture of "almost tensor power states" so that the Chernoff-like bounds will hold and the estimate will thus be accurate. The exact analysis involves many adaptations of the results in [6] . In the Appendix, we prove a more general theorem (Theorem 3) for any observable on one copy of the bipartite Hilbert space in place of , for any dimensions, and for generated by measuring and generated by the above LOCC procedure. We obtain an upper bound for as follows. Adapting Theorem 3, we write the symbol in the Appendix on the left-hand side of the arrow, and what it should be in the current context on the right-hand side. We choose the parameters as , , , , , and (since is unitary). Then (11) where the three expressions in the upper bound, respectively, come from the exponential quantum de Finetti theorem, the Chernoff bound, and the random sampling theory. (In the last term of the above, we have used a tighter bound given directly by Proposition 1 instead of the general bound in Theorem 3.) Also, throughout the paper, denotes the binary entropy function. Furthermore, by the sampling theory Proposition 1 in the Appendix, can also be estimated with samples to the accuracy . Putting these altogether, or for (12) The composable security parameter will still be less than as derived in the summary of the original Lo-Chau scheme. Now, we state parameters that will make exponentially small in some security parameter . Note that is unaffected by our modification to the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme, and we focus on the portion. We choose some security parameter and make each term in (12) exponentially small in by the following choices (with each item corresponding to each term in order).
1) Take sample size for bit-error rate to be . 2) Generally, since has to be small compared to , thus and .
3)
should be large (at least ), while and . In particular, , , and .
4)
. Clearly, for ranging from constant to linear in , there are corresponding choices of that will work. Roughly speaking, and will be the two asymptotic requirements when are fixed. The final key rate can be given by where the first factor is due to the use of private states and the resulting more complicated error estimation procedure (but lower bounded by the above choices of and ) and the second factor depends on the observed twisted error rates (that can be much lower than those relative to ebits and where our protocol provides an advantage) and the choice of EPP (or EC/PA procedure) lower bounds of which are extensively studied in QKD based on ebits.
With this analysis of the accuracy of the estimation, and following from earlier discussion, the security proof for the QKD protocol is completed.
III. PREPARE/MEASURE SCHEME
In the previous section, we have provided a security proof of the PPP-QKD protocols in which the parties are processing an untrusted shared state and are extracting a key from it. Typically, the processing requires quantum memory, and sometimes, coherent operations on the quantum state. As we have noted, EPP-QKD is closely related to the much simpler P/M-QKD. We will thus convert our PPP-QKD protocol to a P/M-QKD scheme, adapting to pbits earlier works based on ebits [3] , [5] , [22] .
In PPP-QKD, the initial state is completely arbitrary. In P/M-QKD, Alice first prepares the state, and then Eve attacks it. Thus, the state is more restricted. In particular, we focus on tensor power states prepared by Alice-the most physically relevant case because of the simplicity in implementation.
Since our protocol already has the distillation steps replaced by EC/PA, there are only two coherent steps to modify: 1) distribute via an untrusted channel and 2) estimate on the sample systems and measure the rest in the computational basis to generate the sifted-raw-key.
We now dissect these two steps. In most of the useful cases, in step 1), Alice only needs to prepare a tensor power state over the bipartite systems and send each of Bob's halves via one use of the given untrusted channel . They are expecting to share the state while they are actually sharing for an arbitrary joint attack by Eve. For step 2), recall that it suffices to perform measurements of product observables on individual system. Now, focus on such a measurement of some on one of these systems. Let be a complete set of eigenvectors of . Note that Alice's measurement on each of her halves of the state commutes with the transmission via the channel and Bob's measurement. So, she can measure first, before sending each of Bob's halves, without affecting the security. It means that she sends the state (unnormalized) with probability, which is the trace of that state, followed by a measurement of by Bob. Thus, a conversion to P/M-QKD can be obtained, with a caveat.
The problem is that in purification-based QKD, each pair of local measurements for each system is chosen probabilistically (from Eve's point of view) and with perfect coordination between Alice and Bob. When converting to P/M-QKD, various naive options fail or come with extra requirements: 1) If Alice announces her measurement before Bob signals receipt of the states, Eve could have intercepted the transmitted state, performed Bob's measurement, resent the postmeasurement state to Bob, and completely evaded detection. 2) If Alice waits until Bob signals receipt of the states, before announcing her basis, and then Bob makes his measurements, he will need quantum memory to hold his received states. 3) If Alice's bases announcement is encrypted with a private key, it has to be of length roughly , where is the security parameter of the QKD protocol (which can range from constant to linear in ). In comparison, an initial key is also required for the authentication of some of the classical messages. What is the minimum authentication requirement is an open problem. If one authenticates all of the bases information, the identity of the states in the test samples for parameter estimation, and forward communication in EC/PA, it will take key bits. Thus, for high-security parameter requiring to be growing with , encryption of the bases information qualitatively increases the amount of the initial key required.
The initial solution in BB84 was to have Bob guessing the measurement basis, and postselect those with properly matched measurement basis. The price is a lower key rate. The method was improved in [5] so as to preserve the key rate asymptotically. We will adapt this technique in our protocol.
The idea in [5] is that, even though randomness in the measurement basis is necessary for security, only a small fraction needs to differ from the computational basis to have sufficient confidence in the estimates of -something we have already exploited in the PPP-QKD scheme in the previous section. Here, Alice and Bob will independently pick a large enough fraction of the systems to be measured for each (the orthonormal basis for operators acting on each of the local systems and ). These samples are chosen randomly and with high probability over the choice, for each pair , the observable would have been applied to a fraction of all systems, giving random samples. Remember the requirement , so that will provide sufficient overlap for calculating , and subsequently, . For the protocol in the previous section, the local dimensions are and each of Alice and Bob have traceless observables to measure locally. Thus, systems will be used for estimating and the rest can all be measured in the computational basis (for estimating and for the (unsifted) raw-key generation) thus the key rate of the original PPP-QKD scheme is preserved. Finally, by the procedure to turn a measurement of Alice and into an ensemble of signal states, the conversion to a P/M-QKD is completed.
We note that the above procedure can be suboptimal, especially if is large. For example, if the decomposition of the single system observable has low Schmidt rank in the Hilbert-Schmidt decomposition, then, effectively, only local observables have to be measured. Also, data from unmatching bases can be potentially useful, but in the current scheme, they are discarded for simplicity of the analysis. These, and other optimization, are issues for future research.
IV. CHANNEL WITH ZERO QUANTUM CAPACITY AND NONZERO KEY RATE
Recall that there are key-distillable but bound-entangled states [1] , [17] , [36] . Using results in this paper, they can be verified, and therefore, they can have nonzero rates of generating unconditionally secure key. The adversarial setting is totally unconditional, as described in Section I-C. Based on one of these states, we construct a channel that has zero quantum capacity and nonzero key rate.
The channel is defined as follows. According to Section III, Alice prepares a tensor power state over bipartite systems and sends each of Bob's halves via one use of the given untrusted channel . They are expecting to share the state while they are actually sharing for an arbitrary joint attack by Eve. We choose to be from [36] (the definition will be given later). This state has three desirable properties. 1) has a maximally mixed reduced state on . Thus, it can indeed be written as for some channel . 2) is PPT (having positive partial transpose [19] ) and is thus bound entangled. Since is bound entangled if and only if is entanglement binding (with zero rate to create entanglement for any unentangled input) [37] , has zero quantum capacity. 3) On the other hand, if verified, has nonzero key rate. Correspondingly, in the absence of eavesdropping, Alice and Bob can use to distribute copies of , verify them, and generate a key. Thus, and provide the example we are seeking. We now define the state . Recall that for a pure state , we use the shorthand for the density matrix . Define the four Bell states as (13) (14) with the projectors given by . Define also the states (15) Then, for , a small parameter to be defined later, take (16) where , , and
For and , where denotes the partial transpose of the second system. In particular, is PPT. When , the term needs not be PPT anymore, but choosing a small nonzero will give a corresponding neighborhood of for which will remain PPT and thus bound entangled. Here, we claim that there is an untwisting operation of the form given by (2) that we can apply to , so that further tracing of will give us the state (18) Note that the transformation of the term is straightforward and also , so we can focus on the term. Let be any unitary that transforms the following states as: (19) and transforms to , respectively. exist, because they preserve orthonormality of the input space. Then, the untwisting operation can be defined as (20) This is because the right-hand side factor first transforms the component in to , , , and , respectively, and the subsequent left-hand side factor (effectively a controlled-from to ) turns into , respectively. This proves the assertion that the untwisted state is given by (18) . The exact key rate in an execution will depend on the observed error rates , but it can potentially be close to being given by (18) . In this case, for very small and (we have taken ), certain EPP (one-way asymmetric CSS EPP) studied in [16] and [22] can distill a key from at a rate , which is according to (18) . Thus, there exists a corresponding EC/PA procedure to generate a key from our protocol. This completes the proof that an untrusted channel, supposedly , is entanglement binding but can have nonzero key rate.
As a side remark, the first term of is represented as a mixture of two pbits with a common twisting operation (no constraint on ancillary state) but differing by a bit flip of the underlying ebit. EPP on these mixtures are particularly simple.
Let us also understand this channel in more operational terms. Recall that a channel is completely determined by the state where is the input dimension of . (22) a) If the outcome is "0," apply . b) If the outcome is "1," apply .
It is immediate that cases 1a), 1b), 2), 3), 4a), and 4b) give postmeasurement states (systems labeled by  ):  ,  ,  ,  , , and , respectively. Also, both measurements yield equiprobable outcomes. Thus, the probabilities for all these cases are . Mixing up the states from all the cases gives exactly the term of . To incorporate the negligible term, we can take convex combination of the above with the completely randomizing channel on . While bit-and phase-error rates are tricky to define, any simple attempt will yield amusingly high numbers.
Finally, we can use the recipe in Section III to obtain a corresponding P/M-QKD scheme. The initial state in this case is . For the estimation of , Alice will measure product Pauli operators on , because they form the desired orthonormal basis for traceless observables. The actual states transmitted are exactly the equiprobable ensemble of the six eigenstates of on each of and for the test systems. The rest of the systems are prepared in random states in the computational basis. Likewise, Bob measures systems in the eigenbases of and the rest in computational basis. Note that the ensemble of states sent and the measurements on Bob's side are exactly those of the efficient version of the six-state protocol. Here, a completely different interpretation via pbits and a correspondingly different classical postprocessing scheme yield drastically different results (the key rate will be zero otherwise).
V. SUMMARY OF PROTOCOLS
We summarize our PPP-QKD protocol and the P/M-QKD protocol in the following. We do not repeat why it is secure and omit the security parameters that are covered in Sections II and III.
We refer to copies of bipartitite systems with . Alice and Bob preagree on some product basis of Hermitian operators . Let be diagonal in the computational basis. Throughout, random sampling of the systems is done without replacement. A general PPP-QKD protocol will proceed as follows: 1) Alice and Bob share untrusted states using their underlying quantum resources. The state is supported on bipartite systems . 2) a) Alice and Bob jointly pick systems at random (by using local coins and one-way public discussion) and independently measure the and parts in the computational basis, and combine the outcomes to obtain the observed error rate . b) For each , they jointly pick sample systems and measure on and on independently. Then, for each candidate untwisting operation, they combine the outcomes to obtain . They pick the lowest value. They measure the rest of the and systems in the computational basis.
3) Based on and , they apply an appropriate EC/PA procedure. 4) They obtain a key of rate determined by and .
Step 2b) is the only placing differing from the standard EC/PA-Lo-Chau schemes.
A general P/M-QKD has the following form. 1) Alice and Bob share some underlying untrusted channel acting on , and they can use it times. They agree on some supported on system . a) For each , let be the eigenvectors of , and Alice transmits a state (renormalized) via one use of the channel (without knowing what happens to the actual transmission). This state is labeled by and , and we let the normalization be . The state is transmitted via randomly chosen uses of the channel. The rest of the channel uses are the same but always have . b) For each , Bob measures on randomly chosen channel outputs. The rest are measured in . 2) Alice and Bob then start public discussion. They use systems transmitted based on and measured based on to calculate the average of (the average of where Alice transmits state labeled by and Bob's outcome is ). a) They obtain a direct estimate of . b) For each candidate untwisting operation, they obtain an estimate of , and they pick the lowest value. 3) EC/PA is applied. 4) A key is generated.
VI. OPTIMAL UNTWISTING
In our QKD protocol (both the purification-based and the P/M variant), the key rate is determined by the estimated , and once these are measured, we optimize over the EPP or the EC/PA procedure.
Consider, for each , the PPP-QKD scheme again. Given , we want to find such that , and generally, such will depend on . As long as for some , is a legitimate estimate and EPP will produce a secure key of appropriate length. (Untwisting only occurs in our interpretation of the sampled data.) To exploit this feature, note that, more precisely, is independent of twisting, but is not. Thus, for a list of possible twisting operators , Alice and Bob should estimate each of the corresponding twisted phase-error rate and take the minimal one to optimize the key rate extractable in EPP. At a first glance, they will need to measure for each . However, recall that each twisted phase error is derived from the decomposition given by (10) and from estimating the product observables in the decomposition. For different , the same set of product observables is measured, and the detail on only enters the QKD protocol in the coefficients in the decomposition (10) , and thus the same set of product observables can be used to calculate all possible , and the optimization over twisting operator is an entirely classical computation problem.
Similar analysis holds for P/M-QKD. Just like PPP-QKD, the choice of only enters the protocol via the classical computation of the estimate . Thus, Alice and Bob run the protocol as stated before, but now with extra minimization of over all possible in their classical computation, followed by the appropriate EC/PA procedure.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have seen that for any channel that allows for the distribution of key-distillable states, there exists a protocol for verifying security. The protocol is related to the scheme of Lo and Chau, the difference being that phase errors become twisted phase errors, and they are measured by decomposing this operator in terms of product observables. Accuracy of this procedure is due to the exponential quantum de Finetti theorem [6] and the usual Chernoff bound and sampling theory. Security of this protocol was proven by reduction to the Lo-Chau proof of security. We then converted it to a prepare/measure scheme, which has the advantage of not requiring quantum coherent control. Furthermore, one can classically optimize over the twisting operation to minimize the corresponding twisted phase-error rate, and thus maximize the key rate. More generally, each EPP-QKD protocol that involves parameter estimation on a small fraction of sample systems and only computational basis measurement and classical processing of the data has a PPP-QKD analogue and a P/M-QKD analogue. Paradoxically, though the heart of the security proof relates to entanglement purification, it never needs to be done in the actual protocol, and noiseless entanglement is never needed in our scheme. In particular, our protocol can be based on bound entangled states or binding entanglement channels with zero entanglement rate or quantum capacity.
This demonstrates conceptually that quantum key distribution is not equivalent to the ability to send quantum information. The "information gain implies disturbance" effect is strong enough to provide security even in such noisy regime. It also means that the ability to perform near-perfect error correction on any logical space is unnecessary.
As a side result, the procedure outlined in the Appendix can be of independent interest. In particular, it follows that the average value of an observable on a large number of systems (without any underlying structure) can be estimated by measuring a sublinear sample even if has to be measured indirectly in terms of a decomposition to other observables (in our case, product observables) that do not necessarily commute with . We have noted that some of the states or measurement results are not used in the analysis. Further research will exploit such data to improve on the key rate.
It will also be interesting to study the alternative protocol based on state tomography discussed in Section I-E and [1] and investigate possible advantages (such as that on the key rate).
A big open question is whether all entangled states can be converted via LOCC to pbits, and related to this question is whether all binding-entanglement channels can be used for QKD.
Finally, our protocol is restricted to some classes of twisting (e.g., tensor power twisting). It will be interesting to either show the possibility of QKD in the case of completely arbitrary twisting or to obtain a no-go theorem.
APPENDIX LOCC ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTATION OF AN I.I.D. OBSERVABLE
A. Finite Quantum de Finetti Theorem and Generalized Chernoff Bound
We say that a state on Hilbert space satisfies the Chernoff bound with respect to a state on and a measurement on if (with high probability) the relative frequency distribution obtained by measuring on is close to that of measuring on . For example, . However, many other states satisfy the same property. An important class is called almost-power-states, which are formulated and studied in [6] . In the following, we adapt results in [6] for our own purpose.
Theorem 1 (Finite Quantum de Finetti Theorem Plus
Chernoff Bound): Consider any permutationally invariant (possibly mixed) state on Hilbert space . Let be the partial trace of over systems. Let . Then, there exists a probability measure on (possibly mixed) states acting on and a family of states such that the following holds. 1) The state is close to a mixture of the states (23) 2) The states (called almost-power-states) satisfy the Chernoff bound in the following sense: (24) where is any measurement on , , is the frequency distribution obtained from measuring on the state , and is the size of the alphabet .
3) Reduced density matrices of the states (to systems with ) satisfy the same Chernoff bound (25) where is the resulting state after partial tracing systems from and is the frequency distribution obtained from measuring on the state . Throughout this theorem, the probability is taken over the actual measurement outcomes that define the frequency distributions. We also use for frequency distributions defined by measurement outcomes whenever appropriate.
Proof: First, we collect various facts, definitions, and results from [6] . is the permutation group of the systems. We define the almost-power-states along to be the set of pure states in (26) We denote the set of mixtures of almost tensor power states along as .
A.1 Facts and Definitions
With the above definition, we will prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1:
If , then , where is the reduced density matrix after the partial trace over any out of the systems (by symmetry, without loss of generality, we take the first systems).
Proof: Since membership in is preserved under mixing, it suffices to prove the lemma for pure , with . We can pick an ensemble realizing of our choice and prove the lemma by showing that any element in that ensemble belongs to . Our ensemble is obtained by an explicit partial trace of over the first subsystems along the computational basis. An element is given by (27) Now, we note two facts. i) , since . ii)
. This is because , and expressing in terms of the spanning vectors of and putting it into (27) , we have Elementary analysis shows that any term of the above sum is, up to permutation, of the form where , and "absorbing" copies of to the last part of the vector, we get . Thus, is a sum of terms of the form , and it belongs to . This proves the second fact, and also the lemma.
The next lemma asserts that a mixture of almost tensor power states behaves approximately like a mixture of tensor power states with respect to a generalized version of Chernoff bound.
Lemma 2 [6, Th. 4.5.2] : Let , , and be a vector from . Let be a POVM on , be the probability distribution generated by applying the measurement to (i.e., ), and be the relative frequency distribution of outcomes of applied to . Then where the probability is taken over the outcomes. Note that we have used instead of in [6] .
Consider the general probability where is a frequency distribution of outcomes of applied to . The distribution , if treated as a functional of on the space , is linear in . Following this we get immediately Corollary 1. This concludes the list of facts and definitions needed for proving Theorem 1.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1:
Consider an arbitrary permutationally invariant state on Hilbert space .
Step 1) According to Lemma 3, there is a purification that belongs to where and .
Step 2) We apply Theorem 2 to with the changes (29)
Step 3) After application of Theorem 2, we perform partial trace over , the purifying space introduced in Step 1). We denote this partial trace by . This partial trace induces from the measure for pure state on in
Step 2) a new measure on the set of all mixed states acting on . (The probability of is given by the total probability of all with .) This partial trace produces also the states defined directly by where the existence of the pure states is guaranteed by Theorem 2. Finally, we note that partial trace does not increase the trace distance between two quantum states, so applying partial trace to the left-hand side of (28) and using the notation described above we get immediately the inequality (23) . This proves the first item of Theorem 1. To prove the second item of Theorem 1, remember from the above that . Since is an almost power pure state, Lemma 2 applies. Further, it holds for all POVM-s on , and in particular, for incomplete POVM-s acting only on but not on . Thus, the conclusion of Lemma 2 holds with the change:
, which gives item 2).
Finally, to prove item 3) of Theorem 1, note that the reduced density matrices of interest can be obtained from the pure state above by tracing: i) first over subsystems corresponding to , producing a state on , and ii) then over subsystems corresponding to . Then, Lemma 1 guarantees that the first partial trace produces a mixed state in (with underlying space ). Applying Corollary 1 to with instead of , it suffices to consider a pure state in . Finally, Lemma 2 can be applied to this pure state with , which concludes item 3).
B. Two Other Useful Results
B.1 Classical Random Sampling:
In addition to the fact and definitions above and Theorem 1, we will need the following result on classical random sampling (or, equivalently, symmetric probability distribution). [23, Lemma A.4] ): Let be an -tuple and a -tuple of random variables over a set , with symmetric joint probability . Let be the relative frequency distribution of a fixed sequence and be the relative frequency distribution of a sequence , drawn according to . Then, for every , we have (30) The result says that the relative frequency distribution obtained from a small sample is close to one obtained from the whole system. [This lemma is similar to (6) , but stronger in two respects-it applies to any dimension and has no restriction on the fraction sampled. On the other hand, (6) ). Let the eigenvalues of be denoted by . Consider an arbitrary state , and let be the probability distribution on (which eigenvalue) induced by measuring on . Let be an arbitrary family of distributions on the eigenvalues of . We then have (31) where is the Hilbert-Schmidt norm and is the trace norm.
Proposition 1 (Classical Sampling Theory,
Proof:
where is the operator norm. Since , using convexity of , we obtain (33) This completes the proof.
C. Estimation-Detailed Description
We consider systems with Hilbert space , in a permutationally invariant state . Suppose the ultimate goal is to obtain the "empirical mean value" of some single-system observable on a sample of systems. In other words, we want to measure , where on the subsystems for . Because of experimental limitations (here, it is the LOCC constraints on Alice and Bob), they are restricted to measuring product operators of the form by independently finding the eigenvalues of and (i.e., making the measurements and ), discussing over classical channels and multiplying their outcomes together. Now, to measure , one can first rewrite it in terms of product operators (34) where we have chosen to be Hermitian and trace orthonormal, so that are real. The 's are "intermediate observables." We will describe an inference scheme that 1) involves only the estimation of the "empirical mean value" of on a small number of subsystems, and 2) the measurement of is done indirectly via measurements of the 's.
The analysis will start with a special assumption about the -element sample, of which are used for indirect estimation. The assumptions are relaxed on that sample. After that, properties of the other subsystems are inferred.
C.1 Analysis of the Sample in an "Almost-Power-State Along ": :
Suppose the first subsystems are in a joint state , with . We expect the state to play a role similar to the state . Define the theoretical direct average (35) We now consider an indirect measurement of applied on the first subsystems, and a direct measurement on the next subsystems. We will show that the empirical average, either obtained directly or indirectly, will be close to the above.
For the indirect measurement, divide the first subsystems into groups. Each group has subsystems. Alice and Bob take the th group and measure on each site as described above (the measurement is ). In other words, the measurement is applied to the first subsystems of the entire subsystems. We expect and to behave similarly. In particular, consider an observable expressed in its spectral decomposition and the probability distribution on the set of eigenvalues induced by the state as follows:
An execution of the measurement gives a particular outcome and induces a relative frequency distribution on . Then, the empirical frequency distribution is close to the "theoretical" distribution . where the probability is taken over the measurement outcomes, is the dimension of the single site Hilbert space, and
Proof: It follows immediately from the third item of Theorem 1. Note that we use item 3) not 2) since we perform the measurement only on part of the state .
Remark: Note also that is constant while is a random variable. We now show that the indirect empirical average is close to the direct theoretical average in (35) . First, applying the union bound to Fact 1, we get (42) Then, using Lemma 4, we obtain that (43)
We emphasize once again that the probabilities are taken over the measurement outcomes.
After considering the indirect measurements, suppose that someone measures directly on the second group of subsystems. Denote the empirical average outcome by
. In a way similar to the indirect case (but much easier here), we show that the empirical direct average is close to in (35) (by applying Lemma 4 with ) (44) From the inequalities (43) and (44), we obtain Lemma 5.
Lemma 5: For the measurements on the state considered above, we have (45) where the probability is taken over measurement outcomes.
Proof: Here, triangle inequality and union bound to inequalities (43) and (44) suffices together with the properties of . Note that the indirect and direct measurements are performed on disjoint subsystems, so that there is a probability space for the joint outcomes.
C.2 Passing From -s to Their Integrals and Then to a Close-By State:
Note that integration and measurement of a state to produce the classical distribution of the outcomes are both linear, completely positive, and trace-preserving maps. Thus, Lemma 5 still holds under the replacement . Furthermore, if (46) we can use the fact that the trace distance is nonincreasing under the measurement (a TCP map) to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6: For a state of systems satisfying , we have (47) where the probability is evaluated over the probability distribution on outcomes of measurement induced by the state .
C.3 Inferring Direct Average on Samples of General State
From Indirect Measurements on Samples:
Now, we pass to the general permutationally invariant state . We have the following theorem. Proof: The parameters , , and come from the generalized quantum de Finetti theorem, the Chernoff bound, and the sampling proposition, respectively.
To start, we apply item 1) of Theorem 1 to to obtain with . Then, we apply Lemma 6 to get (50) Now, we need to connect with . For this, we need the fact that has at most outcomes, and we need the random sampling theorem, Proposition 1, which gives , where is the relative frequency distribution on outputs of induced by the state (partial trace of over systems), is the relative frequency distribution induced on the outcomes of by the state (partial trace of over systems), and is the dimension of the elementary Hilbert space (thus, is defined on ). Using Lemma 4 (taking here for the direct measurement), we go to the averages (51) Applying the union bound to (50) and (51), we obtain the statement of the theorem.
